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The Emergence of Terrorism as a Distinct 
Category of International Law 
DANIEL MOECKLI! 
A considerable body of international norms, institutions, and procedures specifically 
designed to deal with terrorism has emerged over the last few years. This body of 
international law increasingly bears the characteristics of a “special regime.” At the 
same time, legal scholars have started to treat terrorism as a “branch” of international 
law in its own right, both in terms of research and teaching. This article argues that the 
emergence of a distinct category of terrorism law is due to reasons that are very 
different from those that account for the general trend towards the fragmentation and 
compartmentalization of international law. It is primarily the result of political 
pressure by certain powerful states to establish, at the international level, a separate 
legal system for terrorism that mirrors their own domestic special regimes, so as to give 
expression to the “international community’s” sense of outrage at terrorist acts, 
stigmatize the perpetrators, and reassure the public. As these objectives can only be 
achieved if those who fall under the anti-terrorism regime are singled out for 
particularly harsh treatment, the special treatment model inevitably undermines the 
fundamental principle that all human beings deserve equal protection of the law. 
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[T]errorism is not a discrete topic of international law with its own substantive legal 
norms. 
Rosalyn Higgins, 19971 
 
There is no category of the “law of terrorism” and the problems must be characterized 
in accordance with the applicable sectors of public international law:  jurisdiction, 
international criminal justice, State responsibility, and so forth. 
Ian Brownlie, 20032 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, and especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
a substantial set of international norms, procedures, and institutions relating to 
terrorism has emerged.  Arguably, this body of international law on terrorism, which 
continues to grow at a frantic pace, increasingly bears the characteristics of a “special 
regime,” i.e., an interrelated cluster of primary and secondary rules on a limited 
problem. At the same time, legal scholars have started to treat the subject of 
terrorism as a “branch” of international law in its own right.  These developments 
are eroding Rosalyn Higgins’ and Ian Brownlie’s claim that terrorism is not a 
discrete “topic” or “category” of international law, at least if these terms are 
understood, as they generally are,3 as umbrella terms encompassing the notions of 
legal “regime” and academic “branch.”  Terrorism law, it seems, is going through the 
same process as human rights law, trade law, space law, or environmental law in 
earlier years.4 
 
1. Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 13–14 (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice Flory eds., 1997). 
2. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 745 (7th ed. 2008). 
3. See, e.g., Robert Jennings, International Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 278, 288 ff (1984). 
4. See generally, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 
BUFF. L. REV. 679 (2003) (discussing trade law and environmental law regimes); Jo M. Pasqualucci, 
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However, it is not the primary purpose of this article to give a definitive answer 
to the rather academic question of whether terrorism law has now indeed turned into 
a separate category of international law.  I am more interested in the reasons for, 
and the implications of, the emergence of terrorism as an increasingly significant and 
distinct subject area of international law.  Considering that “la question de la 
fragmentation du droit international constitue par excellence le débat doctrinal à 
l’ère de la globalisation,”5 relatively little attention has been paid to the fact that the 
materialization of new sub-systems of international law is not always triggered by the 
same factors and, accordingly, may have widely divergent implications.  There are, in 
other words, very different types of fragmentation.  The reasons why a category of 
terrorism law is emerging are completely different from those behind such categories 
as trade law or space law, and this development therefore raises very peculiar 
concerns. 
Part I is an overview of the rapidly growing body of international law 
specifically designed to deal with terrorism and will highlight some features that 
suggest that this body of law now constitutes a special regime.  Part II will 
demonstrate that since September 11, legal academia has not only given 
unprecedented attention to the subject of terrorism but has also started to treat it as 
a separate branch of international law.  Part III will explore the reasons for the 
emergence of terrorism as a separate category of international law.  Finally, Part IV 
will briefly sketch why this development matters:  what is at stake in the debate 
about the distinctness of terrorism? 
I. THE GROWING BODY OF LAW ON TERRORISM:  A SPECIAL 
REGIME? 
The phenomenon of the fragmentation of international law refers to the 
increased emergence in recent years of special regimes or sub-systems within the 
international legal system.  International relations scholars define regimes as “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”6  This 
notion of regime can be combined with H.L.A. Hart’s definition of a legal system as 
a union of primary and secondary rules7 to arrive at a definition of regime that can 
be usefully applied in the international law context.  Accordingly, the chairman of 
the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law, Martti Koskenniemi, has defined the term regime as follows: 
[L]egal rules appear in clusters that contain not only rules laying down 
substantive rights, duties and powers (primary rules) but also rules that 
 
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 241 (2002) (discussing 
the emergence of international human rights law as a separate branch of public international law). 
5. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Un Débat Doctrinal à l’Ere de la Globalisation:  Sur la Fragmentation du 
Droit International, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2007) (“The question of the fragmentation of 
international law constitutes the leading doctrinal debate in the era of globalization.”). 
6. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:  Regimes as Intervening 
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).  See also ANDREAS 
HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER & VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 8–22 
(1997) (discussing conceptual issues inherent in defining international regimes). 
7. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–99 (2d ed. 1994). 
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have to do with the administration of primary rules (secondary rules).  
Such clusters[,] freely following from international relations, [may be] 
termed regimes.  A regime is a union of rules laying down particular rights, 
duties and powers and rules having to do with the administration of such 
rules, including in particular rules for reacting to breaches.8 
The final report of the ILC Study Group similarly defines a (special) regime as 
“any interrelated cluster (set, regime, subsystem) of rules on a limited problem 
together with the rules for the creation, interpretation, application, modification, or 
termination—in a word, administration—of those rules.”9  Such special regimes may 
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy from general international law, and regimes with 
a high degree of autonomy have sometimes been referred to as “self-contained 
regimes.”10  The Study Group report, however, rejects this term as “a misnomer,” 
since “[n]o legal regime is isolated from general international law,” and it is 
“doubtful whether such isolation is even possible.”11  Instead, the report suggests the 
general use of the term “special regime.”12 
Can the increasingly significant cluster of international norms and procedures 
pertaining to terrorism be described as a special regime within the terms set out 
above?  To answer this question I first examine the growing body of primary rules, 
rules creating a set of duties, rights, and powers, relating to terrorism.  Next, I 
examine the corresponding cluster of secondary rules, rules that have to do with the 
administration and enforcement of the primary rules on terrorism. 
A. Primary Rules 
The vast majority of states have committed themselves to take a number of 
measures specifically designed to counter terrorism.  Starting with the 1963 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
thirteen widely ratified international treaties13 have been concluded to address 
specific manifestations of terrorism, such as the hijacking of planes or hostage 
taking.14  This specialized body of primary rules on terrorism obliges states parties to 
 
8. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, INT’L L. COMMISSION, STUDY GROUP ON FRAGMENTATION, 
FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2003), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf. 
9. United Nations Int’l. L. Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law:  Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, para. 152, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Report on Fragmentation]. 
10. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40 (May 24).  
See also Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe:  Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006); Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 111, 115 (1985). 
11. Report on Fragmentation, supra note 9, para. 193.  See also id. para. 152 (drawing conclusions of 
the treatment of “self-contained” regimes by the International Law Commission in the context of State 
responsibility). 
12. Id. para. 152. 
13. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (2006). 
14. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 2122 
U.N.T.S. 359; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation,  Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
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prohibit in domestic law the specified acts and to either extradite or prosecute (aut 
dedere aut judicare) all alleged offenders.15 
In 1972 the United Nations General Assembly, which in previous years had 
referred to terrorist acts only incidentally,16 started to address terrorism as a discrete 
subject.17  It has since adopted several resolutions that call on states to combat 
terrorism,18 including the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, which has been reiterated in many later resolutions.19  Furthermore, in 
1996 the Assembly set up a committee to develop “a comprehensive legal framework 
of conventions dealing with international terrorism.”20  This Ad Hoc Committee on 
Terrorism has elaborated a draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism, intending to supplement the existing anti-terrorism conventions.21  In 
2006, the Assembly unanimously adopted the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy, in which the member states resolved to undertake a number of concrete 
steps to prevent and combat terrorism.22 
Similarly, the U.N. Security Council, which had originally limited itself to 
addressing particular terrorist acts, has, in recent years and especially since 
September 11, started to impose measures against terrorism as such.  For instance, 
the Council has called on states to work together to prevent and suppress all terrorist 
 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,  Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf,  Mar. 10, 1988, 
1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,  Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 124; International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,  Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,  Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,  Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/290 
(Apr. 13, 2005); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 
54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings,  G.A. Res. 52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/653 (Dec. 15, 1997). 
15. Id. 
16. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, annexed to G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/1883 (Oct. 24, 1970) (stating every State’s duty to refrain from organizing, 
participating, or acquiescing in any acts of civil strife or terrorism in another State); Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence 
and Sovereignty, annexed to G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. Doc A/1408 (Dec. 21, 1965) (stating that no State 
shall incite terrorist activities for the purpose of regime change). 
17. See G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/2114 (Dec. 18, 1972).  In this resolution, adopted 
shortly after the attack at the Munich Olympics, the General Assembly, “[d]eeply perturbed over acts of 
international terrorism which are occurring with increasing frequency,” invited states to become parties to 
the existing anti-terrorism conventions and to “take all appropriate measures at the national level with a 
view to the speedy and final elimination of the problem.” 
18. See SAUL, supra note 13, at 198–213 (listing various U.N. resolutions adopted since the 1960’s). 
19. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, UN Doc. 
A/RES/49/60 (Dec. 9, 1994). 
20. G.A. Res. 51/210, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996). 
21. See Draft Convention on International Terrorism:  Working Document Submitted by India, UN 
Doc. A/C6/55/1 (Aug. 28, 2000) (containing original text of the draft convention); G. A., Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee Established by G.A. Resolution 51/210:  Sixth Session (Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 2002), UN Doc. 
A/57/37. The convention has not yet progressed further than the drafting stage. 
22. G.A. Res. 60/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
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acts,23 to become parties to the relevant international conventions relating to 
terrorism,24 and to adopt the draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism.25  Furthermore, deviating from its normal practice of taking action only 
against state entities, it has established a unique system of sanctions against 
individuals and groups allegedly involved in international terrorism.  In a string of 
resolutions all adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and thus legally 
binding, the Security Council has required states to take measures against individuals 
and entities associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban.26  In 
particular, states must freeze funds and other financial assets or economic resources 
of designated individuals and entities; impose travel bans on them; and prevent the 
supply, sale, and transfer of arms and related materials to them.27 
The most significant Security Council measure adopted against terrorism is 
Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001.28  This resolution, also adopted under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, requires member states to create a legal and 
institutional framework to prevent and suppress the financing, preparation, and 
commission of terrorist acts and to cooperate with other states in this effort.  In 
particular, states must (1) ensure that “terrorist acts are established as serious 
criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the punishment duly 
reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;”29 (2) put in place effective border 
controls and ensure that asylum-seekers who are involved in terrorism are not 
granted refugee status;30 and (3) deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists.31  
Resolution 1373 has been described as “one of the most comprehensive and far-
reaching resolutions adopted in the history of the Security Council.”32  It is 
groundbreaking in that it was adopted not in response to a specific conflict or to a 
situation in a particular country but in response to the abstract phenomenon of 
international terrorism.33  Accordingly, it imposes on all states a set of detailed 
obligations, to combat this phenomenon, a body of rules with general application.  In 
 
23. E.g., S.C. Res. 1566, paras. 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1269, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
24. S.C. Res. 1566, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1373, para. 3(d), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
25. S.C. Res. 1566, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
26. S.C Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (Jul. 
29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 20, 2004); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 
(Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267,  U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
27. S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 
(Oct. 15, 1999). 
28. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
29. Id. para. 2(e). 
30. Id. paras. 2(g), 3(f). 
31. Id. paras. 2(c), 2(d). 
32. Curtis A. Ward, Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism:  The Role of the United 
Nations Security Council, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 289, 298 (2003). 
33. Preambulary paragraph three of S.C. Res. 1373 declares that “any act of international terrorism” 
constitutes a threat to peace and security.  On this point, see Jurij Daniel Aston, Die Bekämpfung 
abstrakter Gefahren für den Weltfrieden durch legislative Massnahmen des Sicherheitsrats—Resolution 1373 
(2001) im Kontext, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 257 
(2002); Jane E. Stromseth, The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Role:  Continuity and Innovation, 97 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 41 (2003). (stating that the resolution was “in response to the more global threat 
to peace and security posed by terrorism.“). 
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this sense, it can be described as legislative in nature.34  The list of measures that 
states must adopt against terrorism was further expanded in 2004 and 2005 by 
Resolution 1540, which obliges states to prevent non-state actors, in particular 
terrorist groups, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,35 and by Resolution 
1624, which calls on states to prohibit by law incitement to commit terrorist acts.36  
Thus, in the anti-terrorism field the Security Council has assumed a comprehensive 
law-making function.37 
A substantial body of primary rules on terrorism exists not only at the U.N. but 
also at the regional level.  In most regions legislative frameworks to combat 
terrorism were already in place before September 11.38  After that date, many 
regional organizations adopted new declarations, plans of action, and, in some 
instances, treaties.  The European Union (EU) adopted a range of measures 
designed to enhance its anti-terrorism capabilities after September 11,39 the most 
important of which is the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.40  This 
Framework Decision lists a number of acts that member states must deem “terrorist 
offences” in their jurisdictions, and it establishes minimum sentences for these 
offences.41  In this way, it requires member states to harmonize their domestic 
criminal laws in relation to the definition and punishment of terrorist offenses.  The 
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, which was passed by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in 2002 and entered into force in 2003, was 
the first international treaty on this subject after the September 11 attacks.  It 
requires states parties to take measures to prevent the financing of terrorism, 
enhance cooperation in anti-terrorism law enforcement, and afford one another 
greater mutual legal assistance in terrorism matters.42  In 2003, the Council of Europe 
 
34. Matthew Happold, Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593 (2003); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”:  Ultra Vires or 
Ultra Innovative?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542 (2005); Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts 
Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2002); Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 175 (2005). 
35. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
36. S.C. Res. 1624, para. 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
37. See Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism 
Measures:  The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 881 (2006) (stating that no 
convincing argument against the Security Council’s law-making powers has been made). 
38.   The regional treaties concluded before that date include the following: OAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 14, 1999; Convention of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference on Combating International Terrorism, July 1, 1999; Treaty on Cooperation among States 
Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999; Arab 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998; SAARC Regional Convention on 
Suppression of Terrorism,  Nov. 4, 1987; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 
1977, EUROP. T.S. No. 090; OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of 
Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 
3949, 1438 U.N.T.S. 194. 
39. For overviews, see Jörg Monar, Die EU und die Herausforderung des internationalen Terrorismus:  
Handlungsgrundlagen, Fortschritte und Defizite, in HERAUSFORDERUNG TERRORISMUS:  DIE ZUKUNFT 
DER SICHERHEIT 136 (Werner Weidenfeld ed., 2004); Jörg Monar, Common Threat and Common 
Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems, 42 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 
292 (2007); Steve Peers, EU Responses to Terrorism, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 227 (2003). 
40. Council Decision 2002/475, 2002 O.J. (L164) (EU). 
41. Id. arts. 1(1), 4. 
42. Inter-American Convention against Terrorism arts. 4, 8, 9, June 3, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 19. 
09 Moeckli PUB FINAL 3/18/2009 9:23 AM 
164 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 44:157 
adopted a protocol that amended the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism by extending the list of offenses that are not to be regarded as political 
offenses preventing extradition.43  This was followed, in 2005, by a convention 
designed to contribute to the prevention of terrorism.44  Regional instruments have 
also been passed by the African Union (AU),45 the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC),46 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN),47 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),48 the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),49 and the Commonwealth of 
Nations.50 These instruments, mainly intended to enhance cooperation in anti-
terrorism matters, contain various specific measures that member states must adopt 
to combat terrorism. 
Whereas these primary norms have been specifically laid down in anti-terrorism 
treaties and instruments, other terrorism-related aspects of international law appear 
to be in the process of reshaping, with the content and scope of the respective norms 
still unclear and contentious.  For example, it has been claimed that the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 and the reaction they provoked have resulted in a change in 
the law on the use of force.  Some states and authors argue that the law on self-
defense has been, or needs to be, adapted to the specific capabilities and objectives 
of today’s terrorists.  They argue in particular that the right of self-defense against 
terrorism now covers the use of force “to preempt emerging threats.”51  Similarly, as 
far as the jus in bello is concerned, some have claimed that the fight against terrorism 
 
43. Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, May 15, 2003, 
EUROP. T.S. NO. 190. 
44. Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, May 16, 2005, EUROP. T.S. NO. 196. 
45. Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, July 8, 2004, 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm; African Union [AU], 
Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in Africa, AU Doc. Mtg/HLIG/Conv.Terror/Plan.(I) (Sept. 14, 2002). 
46. Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 6, 
2004, available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/summit12/additionalprotocolterrorism.pdf. 
47. ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism, Jan. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm; Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], ASEAN Declaration on 
Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, (Nov. 5, 2001), available at http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm. 
48. Org. of the Islamic Conference [OIC], Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism 
(Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.oic-oci.org/english/conf/fm/11_extraordinary/declaration.htm. 
49. Org. for Security and Co-Operation in Eur. [OSCE], Decision No. 1 on Combating Terrorism, 
OSCE Doc. MC(9).DEC/1 (Dec. 4, 2001), available at http://www.osce.org/item/2229.html;  OSCE, 
Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, OSCE Doc. MC(9).DEC/1 Annex (Dec. 4, 2001) 
available at http://www.osce.org/item/851.html; OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism,  
OSCE Doc. MC(10).JOUR/2 (Dec. 7, 2002), available at http://www.osce.org/item/1654.html. 
50. COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM 
(CCT):  COMMONWEALTH PLAN OF ACTION (2001), available at 
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/181889/34293/35144/35145/report_of_the_commonwealth_co
mmittee_on_terrorism.htm. 
51. THE NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 6, 15 (2002).  See also Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein:  Security Council Mandates 
and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 576, 582–83 (2003) (arguing that traditional doctrines are 
no longer reliable and “one must consider acting against terrorist capability before it is employed.”); John 
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 729–30 (2004) (contending that the “consensus academic view on 
self-defense . . . which was largely borrowed from the criminal law, makes little sense . . . [in] the 
international context.”).  For a critical assessment, see Michael Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-
Emptive Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 227 (2003) (claiming that the National Security Strategy “constitute[s] 
an unacceptable expansion of the right of anticipatory self-defence.”). 
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is “a new kind of war”52 “not envisaged when the Geneva Convention was signed in 
1949”53 and requires “a new approach . . . towards captured terrorists,” which renders 
obsolete some of the general rules of international humanitarian law.54  Finally, some 
authors have called for the creation of a discrete international crime of terrorism,55 
while others argue that such a prohibition of terrorism as a distinct category of 
international crimes has already become part of customary international law.56 
B. Secondary Rules 
The primary rules on terrorism described in the previous section are supported 
by a special set of secondary rules, rules that have to do with the administration of 
the primary law.  In particular, these rules provide for the powers of specialized 
bodies to create, modify, apply, and enforce the primary rules. 
At the U.N. level, the General Assembly has established the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Terrorism to develop new primary norms on terrorism.57  The 
Security Council, for its part, has created a host of subsidiary bodies to monitor and 
enforce states’ compliance with its different resolutions on terrorism.  These 
committees coordinate their work and cooperate closely.58  In 1999, Resolution 1267 
established a committee known as “The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee,” which maintains the consolidated list of individuals and entities 
associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban, and oversees the 
implementation of sanction measures against them.59  U.N. member states are 
obliged to inform the committee on the actions taken to implement the sanctions 
regime.60  The Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, which is 
composed of independent experts appointed by the Secretary-General, supports the 
committee.61 
The most important special enforcement mechanism is the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (CTC).  Established by the Security Council shortly after the events of 
September 11, it is charged with monitoring implementation of the detailed and far-
 
52. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to George W. Bush, President of 
the U.S., Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict With Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/cheney/gonzales_addington_memo_jan252001.pdf [hereinafter Jan. 2002 Gonzales 
Memorandum]. 
53. Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva 
Convention (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-
18.html. 
54. Jan. 2002 Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 52. 
55. SAUL, supra note 13, at 27. 
56. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism as an International Crime, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 213, 213–225 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004). 
57. G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 20, para. 9. 
58. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1617, paras. 12–13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005). 
59. S.C. Res. 1333, para. 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1267, para. 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
60. S.C. Res. 1617, paras. 10–12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 19, 2005); S.C. Res. 1455, paras. 5–6, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003). 
61. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 58, paras. 19–20; S.C. Res. 1363, paras. 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 
30, 2001). 
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reaching obligations of Resolution 1373.62  Based on states’ reports on the steps 
taken to comply with the requirements of the resolution, the CTC assesses their 
compliance and may ask them to submit further information.63  In 2004, the Security 
Council also set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 
(CTED), a body of experts assisting the CTC.64  The CTED carries out visits to 
states, particularly to monitor the adoption by states of an adequate executive 
machinery to implement their anti-terrorism legislation.65 
The U.N. established two additional bodies related to counter-terrorism in 
2004.  The 1540 Committee monitors member states’ compliance with Resolution 
1540, which aims to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-
state actors, including terrorist groups.66  States are required to report on the steps 
they have taken to implement the resolution, an obligation that the Security Council 
reinforced in Resolution 1673.67  In Resolution 1566, the Security Council established 
a working group to recommend “practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, 
groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those 
designated by the Al-Qaida [and] Taliban Sanctions Committee.”68 
Special procedures relating to the creation and enforcement of the primary law 
on terrorism also exist at the regional level.  For example, the OAS has established 
the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), which coordinates 
regional efforts by enhancing exchange of information, assisting states in drafting 
counter-terrorism legislation, and improving border cooperation and travel 
document security measures.69  In 2001, the Council of Europe set up the 
Multidisciplinary Group on International Action against Terrorism (GMT), a 
governmental committee of experts tasked with identifying priorities of action by the 
Council of Europe and reviewing its international instruments.70  The GMT prepared 
the Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism.71  In 2003, the Council of Europe created a Committee of Experts on 
Terrorism (CODEXTER).72  This body, responsible for coordinating the Council’s 
 
62. S.C. Res. 1373, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
63. United Nations Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], United Nations High Comm’r for Human 
Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World 
Conference on Human Rights, paras. 6–9 annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/18 (Feb. 27, 2002), available at 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=E/CN.4/2002/18&Lang=E (Proposals for “Further 
Guidance” for the submission of reports pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001)). 
64. S.C. Res. 1535, paras. 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1535 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
65. See Counter Terrorism Comm. [CTC], Framework Document for CTC Visits to States in Order to 
Enhance the Monitoring of the Implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001), paras. II(1)–(4) (Mar. 9, 2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/documents/frameworkdocument.htm. (defining the four main 
objectives of CTED State visits as:  the analysis of States’ implementation of Resolution 1373 obligations, 
analysis of the capacity to implement 1373 obligations, identifying areas of needed technical assistance, and 
the recommendation of steps to be taken for full implementation of Resolution 1373). 
66. S.C. Res. 1540, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
67. S.C. Res. 1673, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006). 
68. S.C. Res. 1566, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
69. G.A. Res. 1650, OAS Doc. AG/RES 1650 (XXIX-O/99) (June 7, 1999). 
70. Council of Eur., Human Rights and Legal Affairs, The Multidisciplinary Group on International 
Action Against Terrorism (GMT), http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/fight_against_terrorism/3_codexter/The_GMT/. 
71. Id.; Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for 
signature May 15, 2003, EUROP. T.S. NO. 190. 
72. Council of Europe:  Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Committee of Experts on Terrorism 
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counter-terrorist activities, prepared the draft of the Council of Europe Convention 
on the Prevention of Terrorism.  Similarly, the OSCE has established the Action 
Against Terrorism Unit, a focal point for the coordination of counter-terrorism 
initiatives.73  The OIC has set up a ministerial-level body, the Committee on 
International Terrorism with the mandate to strengthen OIC cooperation in the 
counter-terrorism field and to implement the OIC Convention on Combating 
International Terrorism.74 
In addition to founding these specialized bodies engaged in the creation and 
enforcement of primary rules on terrorism, there is also a trend towards establishing 
distinct international judicial structures to deal with terrorist crimes.  In 1998, the 
Security Council mandated the creation of the Lockerbie court,75 a specially 
convened Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands that tried the two Libyan 
nationals accused of the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie.76  After the 
attacks of September 11, some scholars suggested the establishment of a similar 
international tribunal to try those involved in the attacks or even suspected 
international terrorists in general.77  More recently, in 2007 the Security Council set 
up a special international tribunal to try those responsible for the terrorist bombing 
that killed, among others, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
subsequent connected terrorist attacks.78  This Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which 
will sit in the Netherlands, has jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism and illicit 
association as well as offences against life and personal integrity as defined under 
Lebanese law.79  It will be the first international tribunal with a subject-matter 
jurisdiction framed exclusively with reference to domestic law.80 
C. A Special Regime? 
In summary, a considerable body of norms, institutions, and mechanisms 
specifically designed to deal with terrorism has emerged over the last few years and 
 
(CODEXTER), http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/fight_against_terrorism/3_CODEXTER/. 
73. OSCE, Decision No. 1 on Combating Terrorism, supra note 49; OSCE, Bucharest Plan of Action 
for Combating Terrorism, supra note 49. 
74. OIC, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on International Terrorism, supra note 48, para. 1. 
75. S.C. Res. 1192, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1192 (Aug. 27, 1998). 
76. See Her Majesty’s Advocate v. Megrahi, No. 1475/99, (H.C.J. at Camp Zeist 2001) (Scot.), 
available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/opinion%20no%203.html; see also  Megrahi v. Her 
Majesty’s Advocate, No. C104/01, (H.C.J. Appeal Ct. 2002) (Scot.), available at 
http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/KIRK1307.html (for the appeal decision). 
77. KEN GUDE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, AFTER GUANTANAMO:  A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST SUSPECTS 8 (2006), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/AFTER%20GUANTANAMO%20REPORT.PDF; Leila Sadat, 
International Court Should Try Defendants, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, November 18, 2001; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at 23; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Terrorism and Justice:  An International Tribunal Comprising US and Islamic Judiciary Should 
Be Set Up to Try Terrorists, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001. 
78. S.C. Res. 1757, Art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
79. Id. art. 2. 
80. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1125 (2007) (explaining that the tribunal is sui generis in “its sole dependence on 
domestic substantive crimes.”). 
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continues to grow.  This body has the most important characteristics of a special 
legal regime:  it appears as an interrelated cluster of primary rules on a limited 
problem, namely terrorism, together with rules for the administration of those 
primary rules.  The set of rules and procedures relating to terrorism that has been 
established by the U.N. Security Council could even be described as unique in the 
international legal system.  In an unprecedented move, the Security Council has 
required states to impose sanctions against individuals and groups, rather than other 
states.81  Additionally, in what is arguably its first resolution of a legislative nature, 
the Council has imposed a detailed set of obligations on states to combat 
international terrorism.82  This set of duties, or, in Hart’s terms,83 primary rules 
relating to the particular subject matter of terrorism is supported by a range of 
secondary rules that create a web of specialized monitoring mechanisms with 
extraordinary enforcement tools at their disposal. 
In addition to the anti-terrorism regime established by the Security Council, 
there are various other primary and secondary rules on terrorism, including 
international and regional anti-terrorism treaties, alleged special norms in the law of 
armed conflict and international criminal law, international and regional bodies and 
mechanisms engaged in the creation and enforcement of anti-terrorism instruments, 
and special international tribunals.  That these different sets of norms and 
mechanisms could also be described as separate regimes themselves does not 
necessarily preclude the existence of one international anti-terrorism regime.  In 
human rights law, for example, one also speaks of “the international human rights 
regime,”84 even though this regime in fact consists of a web of different international 
and regional sub-regimes. 
II. ACADEMIC TREATMENT:  A SEPARATE BRANCH? 
To consider whether terrorism law is emerging as a separate topic or category 
of international law, it is also important to look at the way legal scholars have 
treated terrorism, as it is often the academic world that first divides a subject such as 
international law into different branches in order “to arrange [it] in a 
comprehensible (and teachable) manner.”85  In wider academia, terrorism has 
evolved into an increasingly important subject in its own right after September 11, 
with its own journals, conferences, and courses.86  Reflecting this general trend, legal 
scholars have given unprecedented attention to the law of terrorism and have started 
to treat it as a discrete branch, both as far as research and teaching is concerned. 
In the last few years, legal writing on different aspects of terrorism and counter-
terrorism has mushroomed; a plethora of books and articles on terrorism and 
international law have been published and chapters on terrorism have been added to 
 
81. See supra note 26. 
82. See supra notes 23–35 and accompanying text. 
83. See HART, supra note 7, at 95. 
84. See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
(Verena Tomasik trans., Christopher Cassetta ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003). 
85. See Peter Malanczuk, Space Law as a Branch of International Law, in DIVERSITY IN SECONDARY 
RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 146 (L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn & K.C. Wellens eds., 
1995). 
86. Avishag Gordon, Terrorism as an Academic Subject after 9/11:  Searching the Internet Reveals a 
Stockholm Syndrome Trend, 28 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 45 (2005). 
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international law textbooks.87  The Library of Congress Subject Headings, accepted 
as the worldwide standard for subject heading classifications, lists “Terrorism” and 
“War on Terrorism 2001” as separate main subjects.88  A search of the catalogues of 
the major law libraries reveals that there are very substantial holdings under these 
headings.  At the time of writing, the Yale Law School library catalogue, for 
example, lists 362 books under “Terrorism” and 235 books under “War on Terrorism 
2001.”89  International law bibliographies and other legal research tools now 
regularly include a separate heading for “Terrorism,” often as a sub-category of 
international law or as a sub-sub-category of international criminal law.  In “Public 
International Law,” the current bibliography of books and articles compiled by the 
Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, “Terrorism” is listed as a sub-category of 
“International Criminal Law.”90  At the time of writing, there are 1,674 titles under 
that heading, more than 1,500 of which were published after 2001.  In comparison, 
under “Refugees and Asylum” there are 1,192 entries, under “Air Law” 98, and 
under “Diplomatic Relations” 96.91  The Peace Palace Library maintains a regularly 
updated bibliography on “Terrorism and International Law” that consists of more 
than 6,000 articles and books.92  Electronic databases also frequently include separate 
sections on terrorism:  Westlaw International lists Homeland Security, including 
Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism, as a separate practice area; the Electronic 
Information System for International Law (EISIL) lists Terrorism as a sub-category 
of International Criminal Law;93 JURIST has a webpage devoted to Terrorism Law 
& Policy;94 and FindLaw provides Special Coverage on the War on Terrorism.95 
Finally, there are now very few international law conferences that do not have a 
panel specifically devoted to terrorism.96 
It is not only legal research that reflects this trend. Also as far as teaching is 
concerned, terrorism law has become a significant, and increasingly separate, branch 
of international law.  Prior to 2001, terrorism had to some extent been part of the 
curriculum in international relations and political science programs, but not of that 
 
87. E.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP 
ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:  LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 
(3d ed. 2008); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d ed. 2004). 
88. Library of Congress:  Cataloging Distribution Service, http://www.loc.gov/cds/lcsh.html (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2008); Library of Congress Authorities, http://authorities.loc.gov/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
89. Yale Law School, Morris Library Catalogue, http://morris.law.yale.edu (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
90. Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Public International 
Law, http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/publ/library/catalogues_databases/doc_of_articles/pil.cfm (last visited Feb. 
12, 2009). 
91. Id. (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
92. Peace Palace Library, Bibliographies, http://www.ppl.nl/content.php?webpage=bibliographies 
(follow “Bibliography on terrorism and international law” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). 
93. Electronic Information System for International Law, http://www.eisil.org/ (last visited Oct. 17, 
2008). 
94. JURIST Legal Intelligence, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
95. FindLaw Legal News, http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
96. See The 2007 American Society of International Law Conference, 
www.asil.org/events/am07/agenda.html (offering three panel discussions related to terrorism and 
international law); The 2005 ESIL Forum, http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/english/pdf/ESIL_2005_Forum_Programme.pdf (featuring a workshop on human rights and 
terrorism with three papers) (all last visited Oct. 17, 2008); and The 2004 European Society of International 
Law (ESIL) conference, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/english/florence_agora_papers.html (featuring two paper 
presentations on terrorism and international law). 
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of law schools.97  Today, 35 out of the top 40 U.S. law schools98 offer at least one, and 
in many cases several, courses on terrorism and the law.99  Most of these courses 
focus on the international law dimensions of terrorism and counter-terrorism and 
have titles such as “International Law and Terrorism,”100 “The War Against 
Terrorism and the Rule of Law,”101 or “Guantánamo, Law, and the War on Terror.”102  
Law schools in Europe and other parts of the world have similarly started to make 
terrorism a distinct component of their curricula.  Courses dealing with the 
international legal aspects of terrorism are offered by at least sixteen British 
academic institutions103 as well as by universities in different regions of the world, 
including, for example, Australia,104 Austria,105 Canada,106 Chile,107 China,108 
Germany,109 Hungary,110 Ireland,111 New Zealand,112 Spain,113 Sweden,114 and 
 
97. See John F. Murphy, International Legal Education, 37 INT’L LAW. 623, 628 (2003) (noting that 
several law schools added courses on terrorism in response to student interest following the events of 
September 11, 2001, and providing a list of such schools). 
98. U.S. News and World Report, America’s Best Graduate Schools 2009, Best Law Schools (Ranked 
in 2008), http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/grad/law/search (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
99. They include the law schools of the following universities:  Yale University, Harvard University, 
Stanford University, New York University, Columbia University, University of Chicago, University of 
Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, Duke University, University of Virginia, Northwestern University, 
Cornell University, Georgetown University, University of Texas, UCLA, University of Southern 
California, Vanderbilt University, Washington University, Boston University, University of Minnesota, 
George Washington University, University of Iowa, Fordham University, University of Illinois, Boston 
College, University of Notre Dame, University of Washington, College of William and Mary, George 
Mason University, Indiana University, University of California (Hastings), University of Georgia, 
University of Maryland, University of North Carolina, and Wake Forest University. (The full list with links 
to the respective course descriptions is available from the author). 
100. University of Michigan Law School, 
http://cgi2.www.law.umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/aboutCourse.asp?crse_id=041522 (last visited Oct. 17, 
2008). 
101. Yale University Law School, http://www.yale.edu/bulletin/html/law/course.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2008). 
102. Stanford University Law School, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/courses/details/309/Guant%C3%A1namo%2C%20Law%2C%20an
d%20the%20War%20on%20Terror/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
103. University of Aberdeen, University of Birmingham, University of Central Lancashire, University 
of Dundee, University of East London, King’s College London, University of Lancaster, University of 
Leeds, London School of Economics, University of Manchester, University of Newcastle, University of 
Nottingham, Nottingham Trent University, University of Reading, University of St. Andrews, and 
University of Southampton. 
104. Monash University: “Terrorism and Human Rights,” 
http://www.monash.edu.au/pubs/handbooks/units/LAW7320.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
105. University of Vienna: “Terrorism and the Use of Force,”  
http://public.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/legal_studies/courses/Zemanek-
Terrorism_and_the_Use_of_ForceNEU.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
106. University of Toronto: “Comparative Anti-Terrorism and National Security Law,” 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/students_content.asp?docNo=1190&itemPath=2/16/0/0/0&cType=coursespg 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
107. Universidad Católica de Chile: “Derecho Internacional de la Guerra después del 11 de 
Septiembre de 2001 y la Guerra de Iraq,” http://cursos.puc.cl/catalogo/programas/dei237.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2008). 
108. University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law: “Religious Movements:  Peace, Nationalism and 
Terrorism,”  http://www.hku.hk/student/all/uregcourse/pdf2003/ba.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
109. Universität Münster: “Rechtsfragen der Bekämpfung des Internationalen Terrorismus,” 
http://www.jura.uni-muenster.de/go/organisation/institute/oeffentliches-recht/vr/studieren/veranstaltungen-
sose.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
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Switzerland.115  Although the existence of an academic branch is not established 
simply by considering course offerings, these are a further indication of the trend 
towards treatment of terrorism as a separate branch of international law. 
III. REASONS:  WHY IS TERRORISM EMERGING AS A DISTINCT 
CATEGORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
The emergence of a new category of international law may be caused by 
different reasons.  Even within one special legal regime, the creation of different 
sub-regimes may be prompted by differing factors.  The specific considerations 
behind the establishment of an international anti-terrorism regime such as that 
under Resolution 1373, for example, are not necessarily the same as those behind the 
establishment of a special international tribunal to deal with terrorist offenses.  And 
the reasons why legal academia starts to treat a subject area such as terrorism as a 
distinct branch of international law might be different yet again.  Nevertheless, there 
are a number of common concerns that underlie the creation of all the new special 
norms, institutions, and mechanisms pertaining to terrorism described above.  It is 
on these generic rationales for the special treatment of terrorism that I want to focus.  
These rationales, I will argue, are very different from those behind the emergence of 
other categories of international law. 
Generally, the most important reason for the emergence of a new category of 
international law is that a new social problem or phenomenon materializes, requiring 
regulation at the international level.116  As the ILC Study Group explained, 
fragmentation “reflects the rapid expansion of international legal activity into 
various new fields,”117 as “[n]ew types of specialized law . . . seek to respond to new 
technical and functional requirements.”118  Typical examples of such “new” areas of 
international law include international environmental law119 and space law.120 The 
 
110. Central European University: “Inside and Outside the Rule of Law:  Guantánamo Bay and 
Other Legal Black Holes,” http://web.ceu.hu/downloads/admissions_bulletin_2007_2008.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2008). 
111. National University of Ireland, Galway: “Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,” 
http://www.nuigalway.ie/human_rights/documents/Course%20Docs/SoEmeregencyCounterTerror%20syll
abus%2007-08.doc (last visited Oct. 18, 2008); University of Cork: “Terrorism, Dissonance and Criminal 
Justice” http://www.ucc.ie/en/lawsite/postgrad/llmgeneral/llm_modules/#d.en.11063 (last visited Oct. 18, 
2008). 
112. University of Wellington: “International Law and the Use of Extraordinary Renditions and 
Other Methods of Irregular Rendition in the Fight Against Terrorism,” 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/home/study/postgrad/publications/law-pg-07.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
113. Universidad Rey Juan Carlos: “Terrorismo Internacional, Democracia y Derechos Humanos,” 
http://www.fcjs.urjc.es/Doctorado/pdf/curso03.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
114. University of Växjö: “Terrorism,” 
http://www.vxu.se/english/education/2007_2008/aut_2007_fullsem/rv3401/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
115. Universität Bern: “Terrorismusbekämpfung durch Strafrecht,” 
http://evub.unibe.ch/pievub/?KursID=2285232&KursNr=WN115&UeberschriftID=378171&page=detail 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008). 
116. See Report on Fragmentation, supra note 9, paras. 7–9, 20. 
117. Id. para. 14. 
118. Id. para. 15. 
119. See Malgosia Fitzmaurice, International Environmental Law as a Special Field, in DIVERSITY IN 
SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 182–83 (L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn & K.C. 
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recent creation of an international anti-terrorism regime is often explained and 
justified on the same basis.  As the argument goes, the sort of international terrorist 
networks that were behind the September 11 attacks are an unprecedented 
phenomenon and existing legal systems do not offer adequate instruments to deal 
with it.121  Contemporary international terrorism does not fit easily within existing 
categories of international law.122  The fight against it is “a new kind of war,”123 and 
innovative international mechanisms for cooperation and enforcement are needed to 
bring states to effectively combat this phenomenon.124  According to this account, the 
new body of law fills a gap in the international legal system, or at least creates “a 
more context-sensitive . . . regulation of a matter than what is offered under the 
general law.”125 
Yet the explanation that the new regulatory measures are a response to the 
unprecedented nature of international terrorism as a social phenomenon is 
unconvincing. In fact, international terrorism dates back a long time, as do 
international efforts to combat it.  What could be termed the first international 
conference on terrorism, as well as a first move toward increased cooperation 
between the police forces of different states, was held as early as 1898.126  The 
conference was a reaction to the terrorist attacks that rocked Europe and the United 
States at that time and were seen as the deeds of an international anarchist 
organization.127  By the turn of the twentieth century, terrorism was at the top of the 
global political agenda.128  Acts of international terrorism again started to become 
frequent in the 1960s and 1970s, in turn triggering renewed global counter-terrorism 
efforts.129  As far as the more specific threat from Islamist terrorism is concerned, 
Islamist terrorist networks have been operating for many years, as illustrated, for 
example, by the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.130  Hence, the situation is 
hardly comparable to the case of space law or international environmental law; the 
social problem that the new body of terrorism law is purportedly addressing is 
anything but new. 
A second, closely related, factor for the emergence of new categories of law is 
linked to the requirements of legal practice.  In technical legal areas, professionals 
 
Wellens eds., 1995); Catherine Redgwell, International Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 657, 
657–61 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006). 
120. Malanczuk, supra note 85, at 144–46. 
121. Ruth Wedgwood, Countering Catastrophic Terrorism:  An American View, in ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 103, 103–04, 109–11 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004). 
122. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the “War against Terrorism”, 78 INT’L AFF. 301, 
301 (2002). 
123.  Jan. 2002 Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2. 
124. Eric Rosand, The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism:  Is a Global 
Counterterrorism Body Needed?, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 399, 399, 405–06 (2006). 
125. Report on Fragmentation, supra note 9, para. 186. 
126. Richard Bach Jensen, The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of 
Interpol, 16 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 323, 323 (1981); Rick Coolsaet, The Business of Terror:  Anarchist Outrages, 
LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2004, available at  http://mondediplo.com/2004/09/03anarchists. 
127. Jensen, supra note 126; Coolsaet, supra note 126. 
128. David C. Rapoport, The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11, in THE NEW GLOBAL 
TERRORISM:  CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS 36, 36–40, 46 (Charles W. Kegley ed., 2003). 
129. See CONOR GEARTY, TERROR 53–64 (1991) (describing various terrorist activities beginning in 
the 1970s); BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 67–86 (1998) (describing the internationalization of 
terrorism). 
130. JASON BURKE, AL-QAEDA:  CASTING A SHADOW OF TERROR 93–100 (2003). 
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active in those areas (judges, panel members, government lawyers, counsel, 
academics, etc.) acquire special expertise which, over time, may become a 
requirement to practice in such branches of law.  Thus, the technicality of a subject 
matter generally entails a high degree of specialization, often with expert bodies 
needed to adjudicate disputes.  Trade law is perhaps the most evident example of 
such a specialized branch of international law, where the requirements of technical 
legal expertise have led to the formation of a distinct professional culture over the 
years.131  Terrorism, however, cannot be seen as falling within this category.  From 
the point of view of legal practice, terrorism is just an area of criminal law like many 
others; no special knowledge or expertise is needed to litigate or adjudicate 
terrorism cases. 
Instead, the emergence of an anti-terrorism regime at the international level is 
mainly a reflection of a parallel development at the national level.  Following 
September 11, many influential states have expanded their domestic capabilities to 
combat terrorism through the adoption of special anti-terrorism laws and the 
creation of specialized mechanisms and institutions, including tribunals and law 
enforcement agencies.132  This can be seen as part of a wider trend whereby criminal 
justice systems increasingly rely on special powers to deal with “special” crimes and 
risks.133  Rather than being inevitable for practical legal reasons, this special 
treatment approach is largely prompted by political pressures:  special criminal laws 
are typically “passed amidst great public outrage in the wake of sensational crimes of 
violence” and “designed to be expressive, cathartic actions, undertaken to denounce 
the crime and reassure the public.”134  “Law-making [thus] becomes a matter of 
retaliatory gestures,” relegating the question of whether the new measures are 
practicable and effective to the background.135  This particularly applies in the case of 
terrorism.  Since political violence is seen as an especially serious danger that 
potentially undermines the political, economic, and social structures of the state, it 
reacts more resolutely to terrorism than other forms of crime, and seeks to attach a 
special stigma to it. 
This symbolic function underlies virtually all anti-terrorism regimes and mirrors 
the symbolic nature of the type of violence that these regimes are designed to 
counter.  The military commission system in the United States,136 for example, was 
 
131. For the particular case of international economic arbitration, see Catherine A. Rogers, The 
Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2005). 
132. Examples include the U.S. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 101–
1016, 115 Stat. 272, 272–402 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 
50 U.S.C.); the British Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), 2001, 49 Eliz. 2, c. 24 (Eng.); the 
German Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Jan. 9, 2002, BGBl. I at 361 (F.R.G.); 
and the Indian Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002.  For a good 
overview, see generally GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005). 
133. Clive Walker, Terrorism and Criminal Justice:  Past, Present and Future, CRIM. L. REV. 311, 325 
(2004). 
134. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:  CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 133 (2001).  See also Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in 
GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 132, at 129, 131–35 (noting examples in the U.S., 
U.K., and Indonesia). 
135. GARLAND, supra note 134, at 134. 
136. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 
948(a)–950(w) and scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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not created because there is a lack of suitable fora for the trial of suspected 
terrorists.  From the point of view of practicability, civilian courts and ordinary 
courts-martial are, as they have demonstrated on many occasions, perfectly capable 
of trying terrorist suspects.137  Instead, the creation of these special tribunals reflects 
the belief that international terrorists deserve exceptional treatment as enemies 
rather than ordinary criminals:  trial by military commission primarily serves a 
symbolic, stigmatizing function.138  There is not a gap in the existing system, but 
rather discontent with it; the ordinary courts are seen as too meek to deal with the 
exceptional danger posed by contemporary international terrorists139 and, as one 
supporter of the military commissions puts it, to “wholly satisfy our sense of their 
evil acts.”140 
The perception that terrorist attacks require a resolute state response in the 
form of exceptional legislative measures has led some of the most powerful states to 
press for the establishment of a parallel special anti-terrorism regime at the 
international level.  The pre-2001 anti-terrorism treaties were adopted mostly in 
reaction to particularly shocking terrorist incidents,141 and the same approach of 
giving expression to the “international community’s” sense of outrage and 
condemnation accounts for the post-September 11 anti-terrorism measures.  This fits 
the general pattern, observed by a number of authors, that international law is 
mainly developed in reaction to “triggering events,”142 “incidents,”143 or “crises.”144 The 
problem with this crisis management approach and its focus on particular events is 
 
137. U.S. Federal Courts, applying ordinary procedures, convicted 253 persons for “terrorism or 
terrorism-related [crimes] with an international connection” in the time between September 11, 2001 and 
May 2006. Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty, U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks at the 
American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
138. President Bush has claimed that those tried before the military commissions “are more than 
criminal suspects. They are unlawful combatants who seek to destroy our country and our way of life.” 
Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Bush Defends Secret Tribunals for Terrorism Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov. 
30, 2001, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/tribunals/docs/wp_13001.pdf.  Similarly, Kenneth 
Anderson has argued that because of their fundamental opposition to the targeted state and society, 
contemporary terrorists should be treated as enemies rather than criminals; the civilian courts were the 
wrong forum not only for practical reasons but also for conceptual reasons. Kenneth Anderson, What to 
Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?:  A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United 
States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 609–11, 632–
34 (2002). 
139. See Harold H. Koh, The Case against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 337, 341 (2002) 
(arguing that those who promote military commissions “have been misled by the O.J. Simpson fiasco to 
conclude that standing American courts . . . are somehow incapable of rendering full, fair, and expeditious 
justice in such cases” and retorting that “the U.S. judicial system has amply demonstrated its ability to 
adapt to new, complex problems”); Frédéric Mégret, Justice in Times of Violence, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 327, 
335 (2003) (claiming the support for commissions “reflects a conservative impatience with the ordinary 
judicial system, characterized as overly meek”). 
140. Anderson, supra note 138, at 633. 
141. SAUL, supra note 13, at 130–31. 
142. Michael Bothe, The Historical Evolution of International Humanitarian Law, International 
Human Rights Law, Refugee Law and International Criminal Law, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND 
HUMANITÄRER SCHUTZ – CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 37 (Horst Fischer et 
al. eds., 2004). 
143. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents:  Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1984–1985). 
144. Hilary Charlesworth, International Law:  A Discipline of Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REV. 377, 377 (2002) 
(examining “the way that international lawyers tend to focus on crises for the development of international 
law.”). 
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that it entails the creation of issue-related special regimes that rest on truncated 
understandings of events.145  Reactive international law reform occurring quickly 
after terrorist acts tends to proceed without a thorough analysis of why the terrorists 
succeeded, or even of who they are,146 and results in ill-considered and ineffective 
measures that simply borrow from domestic anti-terrorism policies.147 
The centerpiece of the U.N. special anti-terrorism regime, Security Council 
Resolution 1373, for example, was passed in the immediate aftermath of September 
11.  The two main pillars of the resolution, suppression of the financing of terrorism 
and the use of immigration law as an anti-terrorism tool, reflect the central elements 
underlying the domestic anti-terrorism policies of most Western states,148 including 
the United States, which sponsored the resolution.149  In the face of huge political 
pressure on the governments of all states to show a swift and strong reaction to the 
terrorist attacks, the resolution was approved with hardly any recorded debate in a 
formal meeting that took five minutes,150 despite introducing exceptionally far-
reaching obligations.  This is all the more striking given that it is highly questionable 
whether the terrorist financing and immigration measures required by the resolution 
are an effective means of preventing terrorism or, even, whether they relate in any 
way to regulatory deficiencies exposed by the September 11 attacks.151  After a 
thorough review of the measures introduced by Resolution 1373, Kent Roach 
concluded that “[t]he Security Council, like domestic bodies struggling to do 
something to reassure the public, engaged in a form of bricolage.”152 
Similarly, Resolution 1624 was the result of pressure by the British government 
to target speech associated with terrorism, reflecting its own domestic anti-terrorism 
strategy adopted in the wake of the London bombings of July 7, 2005.  Immediately 
after the bombings, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister announced new 
legislation criminalizing indirect incitement to commit terrorist acts, including 
condoning and glorifying terrorism.153  A respective draft bill, which eventually 
became the Terrorism Act 2006, was then put forward on September 13, 2005.154  The 
 
145. Id. at 382. 
146. See, e.g., Therese O’Donnell, Naming and Shaming:  The Sorry Tale of Security Council 
Resolution 1530 (2004), 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945 (2006) (discussing the hasty drafting of Security Council 
Resolution 1530 in response to the 2003 Madrid bombings). 
147. Roach, supra note 134, at 131–32. 
148. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, §§ 1–16, 21–36, sched. 1 (Eng.); 
Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Jan. 9, 2002, BGBl. I at 361, Arts. 1–3, 11–16 
(F.R.G.); Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41, §§ 47–75, 83–86, 105–11 (Can.). 
149. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 301–77, 401–28, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.); Hale E. Sheppard, U.S. Actions to 
Freeze Assets of Terrorism:  Manifest and Latent Implications for Latin America, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
625, 628 (2002). 
150. U.N. Security Council (U.N. SCOR), 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4385 (Sept. 28, 
2001). 
151. See Kent Roach, Sources and Trends in Post-9/11 Anti-terrorism Laws, in SECURITY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 227, 230–41 (Benjamin J. Goold and Liora Lazarus eds., 2007); Bianchi, supra note 37, at 
892–903, 914–15. 
152. Roach, supra note 151, at 234–35. 
153. 436 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 1254; Tony Blair, Prime Minister’s Press Conference 
(Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page8041 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
154. Draft of Terrorism Bill, (Sept. 13, 2005), available at www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/terror-
bill.pdf. 
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following day, the Security Council adopted the text of Resolution 1624 as tabled by 
the United Kingdom, calling on states to prohibit by law incitement to commit 
terrorist acts.155  In the debate in the Security Council, the British Prime Minister 
promoted the resolution on the basis that the root cause of terrorism was “a doctrine 
of fanaticism.”  Therefore, not just the methods of terrorism had to be combated, 
“but also the terrorists’ motivation, twisted reasoning and wretched excuses for 
terror.”156  Yet there is no evidence that prohibitions of speech such as criminalizing 
the glorification of terrorism that go beyond already existing laws against incitement 
of crimes and racial hatred help prevent acts of terrorism.157 
Nor can the creation of the special sanctions regime against terrorist suspects be 
characterized as a reaction to a new social problem that would fill a gap in the 
international legal system.  There are many other forms of organized crime that 
could be countered with financial sanctions, yet no one has pointed to the lack of a 
respective U.N. sanctions system as a gap in the law.  Only in the case of terrorism 
has a sanctions regime been established.  This fact demonstrates that the states 
represented on the Security Council view terrorism as a special form of crime 
requiring a resolute international response through the adoption of especially 
stringent measures.  These highly political and symbolic considerations seem also to 
have played a crucial role in the passage of Resolution 1566.158  This resolution, 
which established a Working Group to review the U.N. terrorist sanctions system, 
was passed in response to the Beslan school hostage crisis and consequent pressure 
by the Russian Federation to expand the scope of sanctions beyond the Taliban and 
Al Qaeda.159 
Finally, similar rationales underlie proposals for the further extension of the 
international anti-terrorism regime, such as the Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism.  The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
established by the U.N. Secretary-General, has admitted that there is no lack of legal 
regulation that would need to be addressed through the adoption of such a 
convention: “Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 
[twelve] international counter-terrorism conventions, international customary law, 
the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes.”160  Rather, according to the panel, 
the lack of a comprehensive convention is “not so much a legal question as a political 
one,”161 since such a convention would send “an unequivocal message that terrorism 
is never an acceptable tactic.”162  In other words, the justification for the special 
regime is not that international terrorism is a new social phenomenon requiring 
adjustments at the legal level, but rather that it is such an exceptional threat it 
 
155. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5261st mtg. at 4, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.5261 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
156. UN SCOR, supra note 155, at 10. 
157. Roach, supra note 151, at 245–49. 
158. S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 68. 
159. See U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5053d mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5053 (Oct. 8, 2004) (containing 
comments from the Russian Federation’s representative emphasizing the “unprecedented escalation of 
international terrorism,” urging more decisive action by SCOR, and thanking his colleagues for the passage 
of Resolution 1566). 
160.  Chairman of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:  
Our Shared Responsibility:  Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 159, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
161. Id. 
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necessitates some form of symbolic and particularly resolute response by the state 
community.  The same reasoning underlies calls for the creation of a discrete 
international crime of terrorism.  Ben Saul, for example, supports a distinct terrorism 
offense on the basis that “[t]he expressive function of the criminal law cannot be 
overstated; a conviction for political violence sends a symbolic message that certain 
kinds of violence, as such, cannot be tolerated, and reinforces the ethical values of 
the political community.”163 
To conclude, whereas other categories of international law have emerged as a 
reaction to the need for rules that are specifically tailored to a new social 
phenomenon or for actors and bodies with special expertise, the raison d’être of the 
distinct category of terrorism law is very different.  What is special about 
international terrorism is the fact that states perceive it as a particularly dangerous 
form of violence that threatens their existence and thus necessitates the 
stigmatization of the perpetrators and reassurance of the public through the 
adoption of exceptional counter-measures.  This has led certain states to exert 
political pressure to create an international anti-terrorism regime that mirrors the 
special regimes they have established at the national level—regimes that provide for 
exceptional powers to deal with conduct defined as terrorism, in deviance from the 
general criminal law.  In this sense, the emergence of the international anti-terrorism 
regime is a reflection of the fragmentation and specialization of domestic criminal 
justice systems.  At the same time, it is the result of a hegemonic move by certain 
states.  By claiming that the international anti-terrorism regime embodies the 
interests of the “international community”, they attempt to formulate their particular 
interests in universal terms and to have their special interests identified with the 
general interest.164  Thereby, they not only give their domestic counter-terrorism 
policies a global reach, but also imbue them with international legitimacy.165 
IV. IMPLICATIONS:  WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
Even though international terrorism might not be a new phenomenon, it is 
undoubtedly true that this particular form of crime presents a major challenge to the 
community of states.  Surely, this justifies its special treatment in international law?  
What is wrong with sending out a clear signal that terrorism will not be tolerated?  Is 
it not a good thing to stigmatize terrorists and reassure the public through the 
adoption of special counter-measures?  And why would the phenomenon of 
international terrorism and the myriad legal responses it has provoked not deserve 
to be treated as an academic branch in its own right?  Why, in short, does all of the 
above matter? 
 
163. SAUL, supra note 13, at 39 (emphasis in original). 
164. See Pierre Klein, Les problèmes soulevés par la référence à la “communauté internationale” 
comme facteur de légitimité, in DROIT, LÉGITIMATION ET POLITIQUE EXTERIEURE:  L’EUROPE ET LA 
GUERRE DU KOSOVO 261, 263 (Olivier Corten & Barbara Delcourt eds., 2000) (discussing the situation in 
Kosovo, and providing examples of States, organizations, and other entities that advanced the idea of an 
“international community” in order to legitimize their own interests); Martti Koskenniemi, International 
Law and Hegemony:  A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197, 198 (2004) (discussing 
international law as a hegemonic technique). 
165. For the example of Spain, see O’Donnell, supra note 146, at 955 (“Official acknowledgement of 
Spain’s imperilment imbued Spanish domestic counter-terrorism measures, both existing and potential, 
with international legitimacy.”). 
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It matters, first, because the crisis management and special treatment approach, 
which is mainly advanced through Security Council action, concentrates the 
attention of international law on a phenomenon that is primarily of concern to a 
number of powerful states, while at the same time marginalizing issues of structural 
justice that affect the everyday lives of the vast majority of the world’s population.166  
A thorough exploration of this fundamental and complex issue is beyond the scope 
of this article.  Instead, I will focus on the second, more limited, implication:  namely, 
that the emergence of a special body of law on terrorism has led to a radical change 
in the legal discourse on terrorism—a change that has been reinforced by the 
academic treatment of the subject as a distinct branch of international law. 
The traditional approach of international lawyers to terrorism, epitomized by 
the quotations at the beginning this article, was to treat it as one contemporary social 
phenomenon among many and to investigate how international law applied to this 
particular phenomenon.  Today, this approach has been reversed.  Treating 
terrorism as an autonomous subject involves a focus on what is distinct about 
terrorism as compared to other political or social phenomena.  Under the special 
treatment model, the starting point of any legal analysis of terrorism is that what is 
offered by general international law is inadequate to deal with this exceptional 
phenomenon, and so special rules, bodies, and mechanisms—a fresh legal 
approach—are required.167  The result is a self-perpetuating circle of assertions of the 
exceptional nature of contemporary international terrorism and the need for a 
resolute legal response in the form of unprecedented special measures.  Despite its 
claim to “freshness,” this kind of discourse is in fact impoverished.  Constantly 
devised and revised in response to particular terrorist attacks, it focuses on swift 
legal amendments without thorough consideration of the practical need for them or 
their effectiveness, and obscures the possibility of applying general principles and 
rules of international law.  The crisis model of international law, as Hilary 
Charlesworth perceptively observed, “leads us to rediscover an issue constantly and 
to analyse it without building on past scholarship.”168 
How this new approach to terrorism tends to obscure the possibility of applying 
the lex generalis is illustrated, for example, by the Council of Europe Guidelines on 
Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, adopted in 2002.169  The guidelines 
have been widely, and rightly, lauded for making it clear that the fight against 
terrorism must conform to basic standards of human rights law.170  But at the same 
time it is striking that they merely restate what, prior to the emergence of the special 
treatment model, was obvious and did not need stating.  For example, the guidelines 
stress that terrorist suspects should be brought promptly before a judge upon arrest, 
 
166. See Charlesworth, supra note 144, at 391–92 (discussing the day-to-day effects of “poverty, 
discrimination and violence” on the majority of the world’s population). 
167. See Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies:  A 
New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 349, 349–350 (1996) 
(expounding on the steps necessary for developing a new approach to terrorism); Jan. 2002 Gonzales 
Memorandum, supra note 52. 
168. Charlesworth, supra note 144, at 384 (citing remarks of Philip Alston, ANZSIL/ASIL joint 
meeting, Canberra (June 29, 2000)). 
169. DIRECTORATE GEN. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUR., GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON 11 JULY 2002, at 
44 (2002) available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/h-inf(2002)8eng.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
170. See, e.g., C. A. Gearty, Terrorism and Human Rights, 1 EUR. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005). 
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that they have the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, 
that they must be treated with due respect for human dignity, and that they should 
not be tortured.171  Only in the light of the general trend towards special treatment of 
terrorism is it understandable why the Council of Europe ends up pointing out the 
obvious.  Like all other special norms pertaining to terrorism, the guidelines seem to 
be based on the assumption that counter-terrorism is a distinctly separate field of 
criminal justice.  As a consequence, it becomes necessary to state that the general 
rules in the form of basic human rights standards are still applicable.  If it is, in the 
words of Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “la cohérence, et donc l’unité de l’ordre juridique 
international qui donnent leur signification aux normes et aux institutions,”172 the 
special treatment model, by narrowing thinking to what is “within the box,” 
contributes to confusion over the meaning and the applicability of norms. 
The coherence and unity of international law is not an end in and of itself. Its 
significance has been described by the ILC Study Group as follows: “[c]oherence is 
valued positively owing to the connection it has with predictability and legal security.  
Moreover, only a coherent legal system treats legal subjects equally.”173  It is, in my 
view, the second aspect—only mentioned as a side-note in the ILC report—which is 
the crucial function of the coherence of international law.  Already Kant understood 
that only a legal system based on formal, general, universally applicable norms can 
guarantee equality.174  This insight is also central to the theories of modern liberal 
thinkers, such as Ronald Dworkin, whose principle of equal concern implies the 
“political virtue of integrity,” requiring the state to act on a single, coherent set of 
principles of justice and fairness.175  Critical scholars, such as the Frankfurt-school 
jurist Franz Neumann, have equally highlighted the link between the coherence and 
generality of the law on the one hand and the universalistic idea of legal equality on 
the other; situation-specific state action is antithetical to this idea.176  More recently, 
Martti Koskenniemi has pointed out with regard to international law, “the form of 
law . . . [affirms] . . . the principle that the conditions applying to the treatment of any 
one member of the community must apply to every other member as well.”177 
From this perspective, the creation of a kind of shadow legal system for 
terrorism, accompanied by the emergence of a respective academic branch, not only 
threatens the coherence and unity of international law but also implicitly attacks the 
principle that every legal subject deserves to be treated with equal respect and 
concern.  Since the main purposes of the special treatment model—whose principal 
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driving force is the Security Council with its web of anti-terrorism norms and 
bodies—are condemnation, stigmatization, and reassurance, those subject to the 
anti-terrorism regime are inevitably singled out for particularly harsh treatment.  Not 
only are separate legal categories of conduct created but also different levels of 
protection:  the category of people that falls under the special regime is seen as 
undeserving of the same level of protection of the law as everyone else.  This 
premise underlies virtually all norms and mechanisms that make up the 
contemporary special anti-terrorism regime, turning the (suspected) terrorist into 
what the pirate was in previous times:  the “enemy of mankind,” the pariah of the 
international community.178 
The terrorist sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council, for instance, 
provides far less protection to those affected by the sanctions than is generally 
available under national and international law, in particular depriving them of the 
rights to a fair hearing and a judicial remedy.179  This inferior level of due process 
protection has been justified on the basis that the Security Council’s sanctions 
resolutions, by virtue of Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, prevail over every other 
obligation of states under domestic or international law, including obligations under 
human rights treaties.180  The same reduced protection is evident in the 1373 regime.  
Resolution 1373 obliges states to adopt numerous, very far-reaching measures 
against terrorism, but lacks any reference to their obligations under international law 
to respect the basic human rights of individuals affected by these measures.181  This 
omission is compounded by the fact that the mandate of the CTC does not include 
reviewing anti-terrorism measures for their compliance with international human 
rights standard; accordingly, its first years of activity have been marked by an almost 
complete disregard for human rights issues.182  Similarly, Security Council Resolution 
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1624, by calling on states to “[p]rohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act” 
without defining either term,183 may help to legitimate exceptionally vague and far-
reaching restrictions on the freedom of political expression.184  As a final example, 
the claim that the Geneva Conventions are outdated and new legal categories, such 
as that of the “enemy combatant,” are needed,185 aims to deny suspected terrorists 
the guarantees that are normally available to those captured during armed conflict 
under the general rules of international humanitarian law as well as the protections 
enjoyed by those who are charged with a criminal offense.186  Thus, while the special 
treatment model may not place the terrorist beyond the law,187 it does turn him or 
her into a stigmatized figure without the full protection of the law. 
Of course, this is not the only instance where international law serves the 
purpose of stigmatization.  For example, certain forms of crime, including crimes 
against humanity and genocide, are treated as international crimes to which a special 
stigma is attached, as they “particularly shock the collective conscience.”188  However, 
what makes these crimes particularly shocking and deserving of stigmatization is the 
nature of the act:  the fact that they are committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic violation of basic human rights.189  In contrast, in the case of terrorism, the 
reason for the special treatment is the nature of the actor:  the fact that he or she 
pursues political or ideological goals.  This is made explicit, for example, in the 
European Commission’s proposal for the Framework Decision to Combat 
Terrorism: “Most terrorist acts are basically ordinary offences which become 
terrorist offences because of the motivations of the offender.  If the motivation is to 
alter seriously or to destroy the fundamental principles and pillars of the state, 
intimidating people, there is a terrorist offence.”190  What is stigmatized is not the 
crime itself but the perpetrator’s motivation. 
Inherent in this focus on the actor and their motivation is a tendency to direct 
the stigmatizing effect of the special anti-terrorism regime against a certain category 
of people:  those who, because of their nationality, ethnicity, national origin, religion, 
or other personal characteristics, are seen as potentially sympathetic to the 
respective political or ideological cause.  In other words, the creation of an 
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alternative legal system for terrorism inevitably carries with it the danger of 
discrimination.191  The treatment of terrorism as a separate category of international 
law should therefore not only be resisted by those who are concerned about the 
coherence and unity of the international legal system—those who believe that this 
unity can be an end in itself—it should also be opposed by those who are concerned 
about the fundamental principle that all human beings deserve equal protection of 
the law.  It is this bedrock of the international human rights system192 that is 
ultimately at stake in the debate about the proper place of terrorism in international 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Various authors have considered the positive and negative impacts that the 
fragmentation of international law may have on the international legal system.  On 
the positive side, specialized and tailored regulation may better accommodate the 
special needs of the particular subject matter, which, in turn, may lead states to 
better comply with international law.193  Similarly, institutional fragmentation, i.e., 
the proliferation of implementation organs, may improve the efficiency of the 
international legal system by “generating a more refined and precise system of 
interpretation of norms.”194  On the negative side, whereas the coherence of the 
international legal system contributes to its intelligibility and efficiency,195 
fragmentation increases the opportunities for frictions and contradictions between 
different special regimes, thus undermining predictability and legal certainty.196  In 
addition, fragmentation is dangerous from a “political” perspective:  since any special 
regime can be rejected by states, fragmentation may lead to an à la carte approach to 
international law that could ultimately threaten its very existence.197 
Yet the fragmentation of international law is not a unitary phenomenon whose 
overall benefits could be balanced against its drawbacks.  Instead, there are different 
forms of fragmentation.  Different reasons lead to the emergence of different special 
regimes and respective academic branches, and these developments accordingly raise 
different concerns.  This is evidenced by the creation of the international anti-
terrorism regime and the emergence of an academic branch of terrorism law.  The 
raison d’être of this category of international law is very different from that of other 
international legal categories, as it primarily relates to a perceived need for 
stigmatization and reassurance through the creation of an international anti-
terrorism regime that mirrors special regimes established at the domestic level.  The 
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problem with this development is not, as with other types of fragmentation, that 
special regimes may be rejected by states.  Since the international anti-terrorism 
regime is built around binding Security Council resolutions and backed up by the 
political pressure of powerful (Western) states, there is no opt-out possibility.  Nor is 
it merely a technical problem, threatening legal security and efficiency.  The real 
concern raised by the emergence of terrorism as a distinct category of international 
law is that it undermines the principle that every legal subject deserves to be treated 
with equal respect and dignity. 
In one respect, however, the emergence of terrorism law is characteristic of the 
general trend towards the fragmentation and compartmentalization of international 
law.  Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino have convincingly argued that these 
developments “arise as effects of politics and not as technical mistakes or 
unfortunate side-effects of some global logic.”198  When Koskenniemi and Leino refer 
to “politics,” they have the hegemonic struggle between different international 
implementation organs in mind.199  The emergence of the international anti-terrorism 
regime is equally the consequence of political pressures, albeit of a different sort:  it 
is the result of a hegemonic attempt by certain states to impose a global approach to 
countering terrorism that mirrors their own domestic anti-terrorism policies. 
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